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Abstract: This review is about Dóra Győrffy’s book, ‘Trust and crisis management 
in the European Union’. The book takes an institutional approach to analyse the success 
and failure of crisis management in eight EU member countries that needed an external 
financial support to solve their financial difficulties. The book shows us how much trust 
mattered in these processes, both by the conditionalities implied and the exigencies 
during the implementation phase. While Ireland is a positive example, where trust in 
the institutions has accelerated the crisis management process, the case of Greece proves 
how the lack of trust leads to an austerity spiral. The book compares the experiences of 
the three Mediterranean (Cyprus, Spain, Portugal) and the three Eastern (Hungary, 
Romania, Latvia) EU member countries to the Irish and Greek examples, presenting  the 
similarities and differences, and revealing the importance of institutional trust in these 
crisis management processes.
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As the previous monographies from Dóra Győrffy (Democracy and Deficits, 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 2007; Institutional Trust and Economic Policy, CEU Press, 2013), 
this book also deals with the analyses of financial and monetary processes in the 
European Union, based on an institutional approach. The major goal of the present 
volume – published by the prestigious Palgrave Macmillan – is to investigate why crisis 
management was successful in some of the EU member countries, and what were the 
reasons of failure in others. 
The global financial crisis hit the European Union and its member countries quite 
seriously, and the management of the crisis needed immense efforts both from the 
European institutions and the member countries. Eight of the member states had to ask 
for international financial support: Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Latvia, 
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and Romania. The volume focuses mainly on the experiences of these countries.
In the institutional approach of economics, institutions are ‘rules of the game’ that 
have an important role in reducing uncertainty in the society. A trust in institutions 
leads to cooperation which is a necessity on various levels of crisis management. 
Creditors and borrowers have to agree on the conditionalities of a support program, 
in the implementation phase governments have to convince both the public on the 
necessary sacrifices, and also the markets, to be able to come back to normal financing. 
As Győrffy shows it, lack of trust may lead to austerity spiral: when negotiating a 
stabilization program, governments with low credibility are likely to face more severe 
conditions, which will increase public resistance against the policies and thus lower 
market confidence as well. 
The most visible proof on the importance of trust during crisis management comes 
from the comparison of the case of Greece and Ireland. While the reasons behind the 
crisis in the two countries are of different nature, neither was immune from a financial 
crisis, and neither could avoid the pains of adjustment. Trust created a huge difference 
in the crisis management process, however. Greece has not only suffered from severe 
structural problems and from an excessive state intervention: it had a negative record 
of falsifying statistics for years. On the negotiations with the Troika (IMF, EC, ECB) 
this pre-history has created a deep distrust towards the Greek government, which lead 
to more strict conditions. In the implementation phase, delays, the lack of confidence 
towards the ruling parties, protests against the cut of expenditures ended up in 
consecutive failures to manage the crisis, an austerity spiral, and at the end, to the rise 
and coming to power of populist movements (who actually have no alternative than to 
implement the agreements). Ireland, on the other hand, due to its good reputation and 
strong pre-crisis record, its commitment to market-friendly policies, and its efforts to 
take decisive steps from the beginning of the crisis to address the emerging problems, 
could enjoy a more constructive negotiation on support, almost setting the conditions 
for the program by itself. And trust mattered in the implementation phase as well. 
In the Irish society and along party lines there was no division about the necessity of 
austerity measures, which was crucial in the successful implementation of the austerity 
program and the fast recovery of the country.
The crisis management of the three Mediterranean countries, Cyprus, Portugal, and 
Spain, can be well compared to the Greek case, due to the similarities in their economic 
structure and problems. As Euro zone members, with high original indebtedness, 
and low productivity all of them can be characterized as low trust countries. In a 
sharp contrast to Greece, however, they were able to avoid austerity spirals and were 
successful in returning to the financial markets with the help of the support programs. 
The difference laid not so much by the conditionality of the programs: while Spain 
got much more lenient conditions due to its constructive approach, Cyprus had 
to face a similar treatment than Greece, with rather punitive conditionality. On the 
other hand, there was a strong elite commitment in all of these countries towards the 
implementation of financial support programs, and major parties were able to survive 
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the collapse of public trust. As a lesson from these countries, the book underlines, 
that the crisis and the following management period can be used as an opportunity 
for implementing reforms, but building public trust and strengthening government 
capacity is an unavoidable necessity. On the other hand, Euro zone membership had 
also its obvious drawbacks during crisis management.  
Weak institutions and low trust are common characteristics not just of the three 
Mediterranean countries, but also of the three Eastern European EU members, 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania. Being outside the Euro zone, these countries had to 
face the impact of the financial crisis in 2008 already. Low trust and its consequences 
created similar problems to the aforementioned countries. As Győrffy points on it, the 
case of Latvia was rather similar to Ireland: in the shared commitment between the 
elite and the public to neoliberal ideas of the state (as a rejection of Soviet past), Latvia 
experienced a fast recovery after serious adjustment. Romania’s experiences are rather 
close to the Mediterranean examples, where capacity constraints were obstacles to a 
complex reform. Hungary, on the other hand, was a specific case, with similarities to 
the Irish and Latvian case, but with a fundamental change in political approach and in 
the functioning of institutions.
Based on the eight country cases, the book also analyses the connections between 
austerity and growing populism. As it argues – and shows empirical evidences on it – 
the idea of limited government is a key for both economic success and the avoidance of 
populist threat, while lacking such commitment by the political elites leads to economic 
failures and the rise of populists.
Overall, the book gives an excellent analysis of the management of the financial crisis 
in the EU. By focusing on the importance of trust in economic and political processes, 
it offers a well-chosen theoretical tool to point at the similarities and differences of 
each crisis management story. One of the strengths of the book is that it is able to 
put convincing empirical evidence behind the theoretical approach it follows. The 
quantitative data both on economic and on political trends, visualized also by well-
edited graphs, gives us a comparative overview of the crisis and of its management in 
these countries, and the detailed analysis also reveals the background of some post-
crisis trends in these countries.  
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